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Application of the Demographic Potential Concept to Understanding





The article deals with Russian population estimates since 1897 and prospects to the end
of the XXI century. Concept of demographic potential is used to examine past trends
and project future tendencies. Dramatic disturbances of the past century hampered
population growth and brought the possibility of halving the Russian population, the
possibility, which could turn into inevitability if demographic problems are not solved
before the mid-XXI. At the same time the Russian population still has a momentum of
quick growth under the condition of fast recovery of vital rates.
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1. Introduction
1.1 What to be examined and how
Entering the XX century as one of the largest countries of the world, having high
fertility, huge land area, and abundant resources, Russia had perspectives for economic
growth, life expectancy improvements and many-fold population increase. Nonetheless
Russian population only doubled in the XX century and this growth happened mostly
due to the age structure changes. Why was Russian population growth so slow in the
last century? What could happen to the population in the future? How fast should the
fertility recovery be in order to overcome present demographic problems of Russia?
Can immigration help in avoiding the depopulation of Russia? Using the demographic
potential approach ( Ediev 1999, 2000, 2001), these questions are addressed in this
paper taking into consideration the long-range population dynamics of Russia (1897-
2100).
Despite relatively scarce data, a great number of works exploring Russian (Soviet
Union in its time) population trends and perspectives are available both in Russia (e.g.
Center for Demography and Human’s Ecology 2000, 2001, Goskomstat Rossii 1998,
Andreev, Darsky, and Khar'kova 1993, 1998, Vishnevsky and Volkov 1983, Sifman
1974, let alone statistical and analytical yearbooks) and in the West (Blum and Avdeev
2000, U.S. Bureau of the Census 1980, 1997, 2000, United Nations 1992, 1999,
Hollander 1997, Shkolnikov, Mesle, and Vallin 1996, DaVanzo and Farnsworth 1996,
Chen, Wittgenstein, and McKeon 1996, Barkalov and Darsky 1994, Keyfitz and Flieger
1990, Anderson and Silver 1989, Pressat 1985, Berent 1970a, 1970b). Researchers pay
special attention to Russian population losses caused by wars, revolution, repression,
deportations, and famine ( Andreev,  Darsky, and  Khar'kova 1990, 1993, and 1998,
Wheatcraft 1981, 1990, and 1995, Denisenko and Shelestov 1994, Livi-Bacci 1993,
Polyakov 1986, Maksudov 1989, Anderson and Silver 1985, Davies and Wheatcroft
1984,  Rosefielde 1983, 1984,  Dyadkin 1983,  Boyarsky 1975,  Urlanis 1968,  Eason
1959, Timasheff 1948, Lorimer 1946).
These works don’t include demographic potential trends, however, while this
instrument of population analysis allows us to deeply investigate processes underlying
demographic changes and future population perspectives. Most of the works mentioned
deal with reconstructing the Russian population statistics. In this paper demographic
potential concept is used to obtain indirect estimates of main factors driving the Russian
population. These estimates are mostly based on data and estimates of the population
age-sex structure available from other authors. The problem of Russian population
losses, which can’t be neglected in any historical study of the Russian population, is
examined here comparing estimations of actual numbers to those obtained within theDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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projection scenario called “no disturbances”. Latter scenario examines last century’s
population trends, which could take place in the absence of such cataclysms as wars,
famine, etc. Different projection scenarios are examined to explore the future of
Russian population as well. An aggregate population model is used to get forecasts of
the Russian population, the model based on the demographic potentials concept.
1.2 Concept of demographic potential and its application to population analysis
Following is a brief description of the demographic potential concept and its
applications to population studies. More detailed discussion of the demographic
potential concept, its application to population modeling, and a review of related works
are presented in Appendixes A and B.
Demographic potential is an aggregate index related to ultimate posterity of the
population. It reflects the demographic power of the nation, its ability to provide future
population growth. Future perspectives depend on a wide variety of factors, mostly
unpredictable. That’s why the purpose of demographic potential is not to measure
actual population perspectives. Rather, demographic potential is aimed to reflect the
current weight of the population, its potential ability to grow under appropriate external
conditions. For one-sex stable population it turns into R. A. Fisher’s (Fisher 1930)
reproductive value (see Appendix A). Given the potentials for different age groups and
age structure of the population, aggregate demographic potential can be calculated as:




; dx x c t x n t C ,  (1)
here C(t) is total demographic potential, c(x) is the demographic potential of the average
person aged x, and  ( ) t x n ;  is population density at exact age x at time t. Although the
potential (1) relates to one-sex population, a two-sex generalization can be developed,
which is used in this work:
( ) ( ) ( ) g g / ) 1 ( t C t C t C male female total ￿ + = (2)
here  ( ) t C population  is the aggregate demographic potential of given population at time t;
g  is the sex ratio at birth (males to females).
The most remarkable feature of the aggregate demographic potential is that its
change rate equals the intrinsic growth rate of the population. Hence the demographic
potential is more affected by intrinsic reproduction regime of the population rather thanDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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by changes in age-sex composition. To be accurate, this property holds only for a stable
population with demographic potentials based on its own reproduction parameters. Yet,
the author's experience shows that even for real populations the change rate of
demographic potential is a good approximation for intrinsic growth rate. The situation
is different when the population size is considered. Population is heavily affected both
by the intrinsic growth and by changes in the age composition. Therefore, its change
rate can’t be used to make conclusions about the mechanics of the population growth.
Population can grow due to high fertility or aging - depending on phase of demographic
transition. Migration can also play a significant role in the dynamic of demographic
potential in addition to the intrinsic growth. Therefore, demographic potential’s growth
can be attributed mainly to the role of over-replacement fertility and immigration, while
the population is additionally affected to the changes in population composition.
This observation is helpful in decomposing the population change rate into rates
imposed by intrinsic growth and the age structure changes. If, for example, the
population increased by 25%, but demographic potential remained constant, then the
growth happened mostly due to the age structure changes alone. If in the same situation
demographic potential grew by 10%, then only this increase was “real” (generally
speaking it happened due to the excess of fertility over the replacement level and due to
the immigration), while the rest can be attributed to the age structure changes
(1.25/1.10=1.14, i.e., 14%) and a combination of both factors (25-10-14=1%). The
interpretation that only changes in demographic potential are real is justified by the fact
that it is the total demographic potential, which mostly determines the asymptote of the
population. Two populations having the same demographic potentials and the same
reproduction regime in future will ultimately have the same size despite any differences
in their age-sex composition at the beginning. Demographic potential decline results in
ultimate depopulation and its growth leads to a population increase. The decomposition
mentioned above is fulfilled in the paper to explore, whether the population changes
were caused by the fertility above the bare replacement, or they were caused by the age
structure adjustments.
Some comments are to be made about the role of the mortality and fertility in
dynamic of the demographic potential. Being the only real solution of the equation




1 dy e y f y l
y r ,  (3)
the intrinsic rate of natural increase  r  apparently depends both on the fertility and the
mortality; here  ( ) ( ) x f x l ,  are survivorship and fertility functions. Actually it is more
affected by fertility, however. This happens due to the fact that the mortality level is
usually more stable compared to the fertility, and because the role of mortality in (3)
lowers as its level decreases and survivorship at childbearing years approaches the levelDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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of one. Hence the deviations of the intrinsic growth rate from its trend usually reflect
changes in the fertility rather than in the mortality level. There are two main exceptions
to this rule. Firstly, at the beginning of the demographic transition intrinsic growth rate
can increase due to decrease in mortality at childbearing ages and below. This was the
case of Russia in 1940s, when at the end of the World War II infant mortality in Russia
decreased by almost 50% due to use of advanced medicines (Sifman 1979). Secondly,
unusual mortality changes, which accompany wars, famine, etc. highly affect the
intrinsic growth rate and the demographic potential. These events aren’t examined in
terms of intrinsic rates however. Rather, they are examined in terms of population and
potential losses.
2. Data
Data on age-sex composition of the population are primarily used in the paper. Data
were taken from different sources. The long-range data set is provided in a publication
of the Russian Statistical Agency (Goskomstat Rossii 1998). Data for Stalin’s period
were reconstructed by a team of Russian demographers ( Andreev,  Darsky, and
Khar'kova 1998). For the period after 1960 population data were published in Russian
and Soviet statistical yearbooks. In addition to sources described above some useful
data were obtained from International Data Base of the US Census Bureau (U.S. Bureau
of the Census 1999), which provides projections of population age-sex structure as well
as historical data (available for Russia since 1989).
Demographic potentials used in the paper (Table 1) are based on US 1991 data
(National Center for Health Statistics 1995, University of California, Berkeley 1998). It
has been made both for the sake of comparability with results obtained earlier and in
order to make use of aggregate population models based on demographic potentials
pattern mentioned (Ediev 2000, 2001).
Table 1: Age-sex specific demographic potentials (5-year age intervals). US 1991.
Age Males Females Age Males Females
0 1.00 1.00 25 0.60 0.44
5 1.01 1.01 30 0.33 0.19
10 1.01 1.01 35 0.14 0.05
15 1.00 0.95 40 0.05 0.01
20 0.86 0.74 45 0.02 0.00Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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3. Population and demographic potential trends since 1897
3.1 General perspective
Russian population trends since 1897 as well as a projection until 2050 (U.S. Bureau of
the Census 2000) are presented in Fig. 1. Despite two World Wars, the Revolution of
1917, the Russian Civil War, famine in 20s and 30s, and recent socioeconomic
problems, the population in Russia has grown in the XX century. It happened due to
two main factors – intrinsic growth (i.e., high fertility) and the age structure changes, as
it usually happens in the process of demographic transition. Roles of these two forces –
intrinsic growth and the age structure changes – can be separated comparing the
population trend (Fig. 1) to that of demographic potential (Fig. 2).
Figure 1:  Russian population in 1897-2050 (millions).
Between 1897 and the present population increased from about 66 mln. to 146 mln.,
i.e., by 121%. At the same time demographic potential grew by only 40%. It means that
only about 33% of population growth happened due to intrinsic growth (plusDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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migration), 48% – due to the age structure changes (caused by life expectancy
improvements and young age structure of initial population), and 19% – due to
interaction of both factors.
Figure 2:  Russian demographic potential in 1897-2050 (millions).
Changes in the age composition of the Russian population are reflected in the dynamic
of the average demographic potential, which is presented in Fig. 3. During the process
of demographic transition the average demographic potential changes from the initial
level, which corresponds to reproduction regime before the transition, to another level
corresponding the ultimate reproduction pattern. Despite irregularities in the age-sex
structure of the population caused by war, famine, etc., dynamic of the average
demographic potential is smooth enough and it can be used as a good measure for
demographic transition timing. Usually the lower the intrinsic growth rate and the
mortality, the lower the stationary level of average demographic potential. Descending
trend presented in Fig. 3 represents a decrease in both the mortality and fertility in
Russia. Accelerated decrease of average demographic potential after the late 1980s is
caused by the post reform fertility fall, which lowered the stationary level of the
average potential. The momentum of population growth or the growth potential is
proportional to population’s average demographic potential (see Appendix A for moreDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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accurate relation). Hence Fig. 3 reflects the dynamic of Vincent’s potential of Russia,
i.e., of its momentum as well.
Figure 3:  Average Russian’s demographic potential. 1897-2050.
The process of Russian demographic transition wasn’t steady. Rather, it was interrupted
by different events: two World Wars, several local wars, revolutions, Civil War,
famine, repressions, and massive population movements. In order to roughly estimate
how crucial the role of these events was, population projection was conducted from
1897 to 2100 using demographic potential forecasting technique (Ediev 2000, 2001).
Life expectancy and fertility were taken equal to actual values in relatively calm periods
(Goskomstat  Rossii 1998,  Andreev,  Darsky, and  Khar'kova 1998) while for other
periods reproduction parameters were interpolated. Fertility assumed to fall continually
and reach replacement level in the late 60s, migration was set to be zero all the time,
and life expectancy was set to grow in the XXI century up to 80 years in 2050. The
most crucial parameter for long-range population projection is the intrinsic growth rate,
i.e., the demographic potential’s change rate under zero migration in the context of this
paper. Actual values of this parameter as well as those used in the “no disturbances”
scenario are shown in Fig. 4.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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Figure 4:  Demographic potential’s change rate: actual and that used in the “no
disturbances” scenario.
Resultant population trends obtained under the “no disturbances” scenario are presented
in Fig. 5. Under this scenario population would grow by 291% in 1897-2000 (up to
258 mln.), and demographic potential by 180%. About 58% of possible population
growth was lost due to socio-political disturbances; it constitutes 113 mln., i.e., more
than 75% of present Russia. The loss of demographic potential is higher (78% of
possible growth) because the age structure under the “no disturbances” scenario is
younger than in the actual 2000 population; the latter was affected by an under-
replacement fertility trend. I.e., more accurate estimate for population losses is higher:
155 mln. It can be obtained if we assume further convergence of actual fertility to
replacement level and compare corresponding projection results to those under the “no
disturbances” assumptions. Even more, real losses are probably higher, since
disturbances of demographic transition in Russia led to acceleration of fertility fall,
which was not reflected in the “no disturbances” scenario (see Fig. 4). Timing of
Russian population losses can be seen in Fig. 6, which compares actual population trend
to that obtained in the “no disturbances” scenario.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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Figure 5: Russian demographic trends under the “no disturbances” scenario.
Figure 6:  Actual population and that obtained under the “no disturbances”
scenario.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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3.2 Different stages of Russian population history
Following the trends of population and demographic potential, several demographic
stages in Russian population history can be pointed out:
after 1897 and before World War I;
after World War I and till the mid-1920s;
after end of the Civil War and till World War II;
after World War II and till the 1960s;
the 1960s to the 1980s;
the reform and post-reform period.
3.2.1 Russian population dynamic before World War I
In spite of defeat in the Russian-Japanese War and the Revolution of 1905, Russia grew
without significant deviations from the “no disturbances scenario” between 1897 and
1914. This period was characterized by high mortality and high fertility as well. TFR at
the level of 5-7 implied demographic potential’s growth rate of more than 2% yearly
despite life expectancy at birth of about 30 years and remarkable emigration from the
country.
3.2.2 Russian population after World War I and before the mid 1920s
World War I followed by the Revolution, the Civil War, high emigration, intervention,
and famine of 1921-1922 depressed the Russian population trend dramatically (Fig. 6).
The “no disturbances” scenario leads to the population of 103 mln. in 1923, while the
actual figure was only 86 mln., i.e., about 17 mln. of the possible population in 1923 or
about half of all the possible population growth since 1897 was lost.
3.2.3 Russia between the Civil War and World War II (1923-1941)
After the end of the Civil War and following the famine of 1921-1922, a relatively
stable period began. The government launched the “New Economic Policy” stimulating
economic growth. At that period population and demographic potential steady growth
returns - for the first time after World War I. In 1926 intrinsic growth rate was about
1.7% (TFR of about 5.3), in 1927 it grew to 2.12% (TFR of about 7), and then
decreased down to 0.51% in 1932. The famine of 1933 halted population growth andDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
300 http://www.demographic-research.org
lowered fertility afterwards. As early as 1934 the population increased, but this
happened due to the age structure changes rather than fertility recovery – the
demographic potential increased only a year later (Fig. 3). Relatively fast growth of the
demographic potential started only in 1937/38; it happened partly as compensation and
partly as a result of the abortions prohibition in 1936. The growth was slowing down
and later World War II interrupted it. Under the “no disturbances” scenario mentioned
above, the population grows 108% by 1941, while actual growth was only 68%. I.e.,
almost half (37%) or 26 mln. of possible population growth was lost due to dramatic
events at the beginning of the century. This estimate is consistent with other estimates
of Russian demographic losses before the 1940s ( Denisenko and  Shelestov 1994,
Andreev, Darsky, and Khar'kova 1993, Wheatcraft 1990, Maksudov 1989, Anderson
and Silver 1985, Boyarsky 1975, Lorimer 1946).
Figure 7: Male/female ratio of demographic potentials in Russia.
3.2.4 Consequences of World War II and postwar trends in Soviet Russia
World War II cost Russia about 13% of the population (15 mln.) and 16% of its
demographic potential. This was the most dramatic cataclysm of the century, which
attracted the attention of many researchers ( Andreev,  Darsky, and  Khar'kova 1990,
1993, and 1998, Denisenko and Shelestov 1994, Maksudov 1989, Dyadkin 1983, Eason
1959, Timasheff 1948, Lorimer 1946).Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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Male potential was more affected by the War than that of females; its loss was at
the level of 20% while female’s potential loss was about 12%. This selective effect
increased gender disparity (Fig. 7), which determined social problems in decades to
come. These losses weren’t the only consequences of the War. It affected the fertility
trend as well. After World War II potential grew much more slowly than before, while
it should have grown faster under the compensation baby boom. Postwar growth of
demographic potential was modest (0.76% annually between 1946 and 1963) and
insufficient to make up for wartime losses. This is even more remarkable if we take into
account the fact of unprecedented decrease in child mortality during wartime (Zakharov
1996,  Sifman 1979) and later life expectancy improvements ( Andreev,  Darsky, and
Khar'kova 1998). The famine of 1947, which cost the Russia about half a million lives
(Andreev, Darsky, and Khar'kova 1998) was one of the low fertility causes in late-40s.
In addition to the low fertility the postwar change in sign of migration flows wasn’t in
favor of Russia. The Russian population had negative migration balance after World
War II and till the mid-70s.
In the 1960s the new actor – the process of urbanization – played its dramatic role.
While before World War II Russia was a rural country, as early as at the beginning of
the 1960s its population was living primarily in urban areas. Rural population had high
fertility, but it moved to urban areas with low fertility that brought the country to a level
of replacement: since the 1960s fertility dropped and demographic potential became
almost constant till the end of the USSR. Life expectancy was already stagnating at that
time as well (Goskomstat Rossii 1998). The fact that the population continued to grow
at that period reflects the impact of the age structure momentum accumulated before.
The slight growth of the demographic potential in the 1980s was due to the Soviet
government's attempts to encourage fertility and a positive shift in external migration.
External migration, in addition to intrinsic growth and the age structure changes
was the third force driving the population. Before the mid-70s migration resulted
primarily in the drain of demographic potential to other republics of the USSR. But
later, and especially after the Russian reforms, immigration was partly compensating
for the decline of demographic potential (Fig. 8).Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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Figure 8: Dynamic of Russian female demographic potential (millions) – actual
and hypothetical, at zero migration at reproductive ages, 1979-1996.
3.2.5 Russian population after the crush of the Soviet Union
The last stage begins with  Gorbachev’s  perestroika, the collapse of the USSR, and
following reforms (consequences of Chechenian conflict aren’t counted here due to lack
of data). Fertility dropped dramatically and as a result Russian demographic potential
declined in 1989-2000 with annual rate of about 1% and became 14% less in 2000 than
before World War II despite tangible immigration to the country. At the same time
mortality grew till the mid-90s and then slowed down again. Recent results (Shkolnikov
and Vishnevsky 2000) show, however, that the 1990’s mortality growth was probably a
compensational growth after the decline in the late 1980s (due to the anti-alcohol
campaign), rather than a “cost of reforms”. Anyway, the fertility decline caused by the
last socio-political and economic transition resulted in an unprecedented decrease of
demographic potential and opened the way to the deep depopulation of Russia.
4. Demographic prospects of Russia
4.1 Results and implications of US Census Bureau projections
Russian demographic potential will decrease from about 63 mln. in 1989 to 33 mln. in
2050 according to the U.S. Census Bureau projection. It means that if Russia doesn’t
solve its problems before 2050, the population will almost inevitably decrease by aboutDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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50% (life expectancy improvements could lower this estimation to about 40%).
Although the Russian population will be only 20% less in 2050 compared to 1989, it
will be much more aged at that time (Fig. 9), which will further accelerate the
population decline.
Figure 9: Age-sex composition of Russia according the US Census Bureau
projection.
Is it possible to escape from this depopulation trap?   How could it be possible is put to
question below by examining different population projection scenarios.
4.2 Alternative scenarios of Russian population trends in the XXI century
In order to explore how different scenarios could affect the Russian future, population
projections were conducted within several variants. Demographic potential projecting
technique (Ediev 2000, 2001) was used to obtain forecasts in all scenarios. A brief
introduction to the technique can be found in Appendix B.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
304 http://www.demographic-research.org
The Center for Demography and Human’s Ecology made Russian population
projections up to 2020 using component methods and a  multiregional approach
(Andreev and Khar'kova 2000). Assumptions of these forecasts as well as additional
assumptions about the dynamics after 2020 are used in this paper to get “low”,
“medium”, and “high” variants. The following standard procedures are used to get
assumptions after 2020. All the parameters driving the population projection in
demographic potential projection technique – life expectancy at birth, intrinsic growth
rate, and immigration – are set to be constant after 2050 (life expectancy being 80;
intrinsic growth at the replacement level, i.e., 0%; and immigration at the level of zero).
These parameters are interpolated linearly between 2020 and 2050.
Now let us proceed with a discussion of projections results.
In the “low” scenario the intrinsic growth rate starts from about –3% in 2020 (TFR
of 1.01) and increases up to the replacement level in 2050. Results of projection within
this scenario are presented in Fig. 10. In 1989-2050 the population declines by 47%. In
the same period demographic potential declines by 69%, predetermining further
depopulation. As a result, by the end of the next century the population will have
declined by 62% with respect to 1989 (discrepancy between last two figures can be
attributed to the role of life expectancy improvements). In this scenario the Russian
population ultimately stabilizes at the level of 38% of current population, i.e., 56 mln.
In the “medium” scenario the intrinsic growth rate is –2.66% in 2020 (TFR of
1.12) and immigration is higher than in the previous scenario. Under this scenario
(Fig. 11) the Russian population decreases by 37% in 2050 and by 53% in 2100 with
respect to 1989. Demographic potential decreases by 62% before reaching stationary
level. The population size stabilizes at the level of about 48% of 2000 population (69
mln.).Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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Figure 10:  Russian population projection within the “low” scenario.
Figure 11: Russian population projection within the “medium” scenario.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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In the “high” variant the population decreases by 24% in 2050 and by 37% in 2100 with
respect to 1989 (Fig. 12). Demographic potential decreases by 48%. Ultimately the
Russian population stabilizes at 64% of the current level, i.e., depopulation stops at 93
mln.
Figure 12: Russian population projection within the “high” scenario.
4.3 Can fertility recovery or higher immigration keep Russia from depopulation?
The next scenarios aren’t just a transition from variants of the Center for Demography
and Human’s Ecology to the stationary model. These projections are made in order to
examine if different demographic improvements can prevent the Russia from deep
depopulation. These models are based on the “high” variant’s assumptions with
different corrections depending on the scenario.
The scenario called “fast recovery” (Fig. 13) assumes that fertility decline
observed in Russia in the reform era will be compensated by a fast recovery and a
“baby-boom” (implying the intrinsic growth rate of 0.5%, i.e., TFR of about 2.44) in
2010-2020, which will be followed by replacement level afterwards. The result is
dramatic: relatively young age structure, life expectancy improvements included inDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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forecasts, and high immigration at the beginning combined with fertility improvements
lead to a steady population increase and a stationary level of about 170 mln. This is
16% more than the current population. Demographic potential under fast recovery
becomes 3% less in 2100 compared to 1989, but 8% more than in 2000.
Another scenario, “late recovery”, assumes that the baby boom will happen only
after 2050 (Fig. 14). As mentioned above, the Russian population will be very aged in
2050, and will not be as sensitive to fertility recovering after that. Under this scenario
the population never grows in the XXI century, decreases by 28% in 2100 with respect
to the current population, and stabilizes at the level of 106 mln. Only life expectancy
growth up to 80 years prevents the population decrease by about 40% in this scenario
following the same loss of demographic potential. As a result, Russian 2100 population
under fast recovery is about 60% higher than that under the late recovery.
Figure 13: “Fast recovery” scenario.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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Figure 14: “Late recovery” scenario.
Figure 15: “High immigration” scenario.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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The last scenario (“high immigration”, Fig. 15) addresses the possibility of
compensating for low fertility with a higher immigration rate. In this scenario
everything is the same as in “high” scenario plus an additional immigration flow of
0.5% in 2010-2040 (by the year 2050 population returns to the stationary pattern as in
scenarios above). Resultant immigration in 2010 is about three-fold higher than in the
“high” scenario. At the beginning of the XXI century such a substantial additional
immigration leads to population growth. Yet, immigration can’t compensate for low
fertility in the long term. Demographic potential declines and finally population size
decreases too. As a result, by 2100 the population decreases by 21% and demographic
potential decreases by 35% with respect to 1989. Finally, the population stabilizes at the
level of 116 mln. (79% of current population).
4.4 Comparative analyses of different population projections
Figs. 16 and 17 summarize population projection results under all the scenarios
mentioned with two additions. First, the result of projection under the “no disturbances”
scenario mentioned above is added to the figure in order to compare past trends and
future scenarios to what the Russian population would be were it not for the socio-
political problems of last century. Secondly, the US Census Bureau’s projection is
prolonged till 2100 under zero migration, 80-year life expectancy, and replacement
fertility assumptions (like in all other projections).
The demographic potential trend (Fig. 17) is more informative about projection
assumptions used, while the population trend (Fig. 16) shows implications of those
assumptions. All the scenarios except for the US Census Bureau projection are more
optimistic about the reproduction level in 2050 and later – they assume convergence to
replacement level at that time, as it was mentioned above. The Census Bureau’s
projection assumes lower fertility leading to falling demographic potential. This
approach, applied to years after 2050 as well, leads to a many-fold population and
demographic potential decrease (10-fold and more).Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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Figure 16: Russian population: past trends and future projections under different
assumptions (1897-2100).
Figure 17:  Russian demographic potential: past trends and future projections under
different scenarios (1897-2100).Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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It can be seen (Fig. 16) that almost all the future scenarios (except for “fast recovery”)
lead to remarkable depopulation of Russia. Even high immigration or late recovery of
vital rates can not help. Up to 40-60% of the current population can be lost if this
depopulation happens. It means that Russia would loose up to 70-80% of its possible
population compared to the “no disturbances” scenario due to the historical cataclysms
of the XX century and their consequences. Fast fertility recovery provides better results
than the “high immigration” scenario in the nearest future and leads to steady
population growth in the long-range as well, restoring the pre-reform population status
quo.
5. Conclusions
Russian population growth in the XX century was interrupted and hampered by
dramatic events: wars, revolution, emigration, famine, urbanization, and socioeconomic
transition. These events have already cost Russia about a half of its possible population
in 2000. If reproductive patterns in Russia remain on a low level till the mid-XXI
century, the country could face further population halving and even deeper decline. At
the same time, fast fertility recovering can instantly result in steady population growth
up to about 170 million. But if demographic improvements are delayed till the mid-
century, the population will be very aged and deep depopulation will be almost
inevitable. Immigration could partly compensate for the effect of low fertility and delay
the process of depopulation; but it should be at the level of at least 0.5-1% annually.
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Notes
An Excel spreadsheet with the aggregate population projecting model used in this paper
can be downloaded from the Demographic Research web site. Please see the
introductory HTML cover sheet for this  paper at  http://www.demographic-
research.org/volumes/vol4/9/ .
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Appendix A. Concept of demographic potential and related issues
Idea of potential inherent to current population state was exploited in the demography
since long ago. There were several apparently independent attempts to develop and
make use of this fertile concept. Here is a list of different concepts developed within the
framework of “potential ideology”: Fisher’s reproductive value (1930s), Vincent’s and
Bourgeois-Pichat’s  growth potential (1940s and 1960s),  Goodman’s  eventual
reproductive value (1960s), Keyfitz’s stable equivalent Q and the momentum (1960s)
with its numerous extensions (1970s to 1990s), Tognetti’s gross reproductive worth
(1970s), Hersch and later researcher’s works on potential demography (1940s). Author
became familiar with these works only after developing his own concept of
demographic potential. It isn’t surprising that all the concepts mentioned are mutually
interrelated except for concepts of  Hercsh’s potential demography, which fall far
beyond the scope of this paper (Hersch 1944). It should be mentioned that the Vincent’s
and Bourgeois-Pichat’s growth potential and the  Keyfitz’s momentum represent the
same concept.
Interrelation mentioned is perfect for stationary population, less perfect for stable
population, and vanishes when a population with arbitrary reproduction regime is
considered. When stationary population is considered the total reproductive value (both
in Fisher’s and Goodman’s interpretation), total gross reproductive worth, and total
demographic potential are proportional to the population size times the momentum or
the growth potential. For stable population gross reproductive worth stands alone being
only approximately related to other concepts. When population with arbitrary
reproduction pattern in future is concerned, the concepts of reproductive value,
momentum, and growth potential aren’t determined.
Risking by missing some important works, especially those written in French,
author presents below a short historical review of works related to the subject. After this
review the concept of demographic potential will be described as author interprets it.
A.1 Fishers’ reproductive value
First step was made by Ronald Fisher (Fisher 1930), geneticist who dealt with a
question: how significant is the contribution of average person aged  x to future
generations’ births. Within the framework of genetics this estimate, called reproductive
value, would be a measure of a contribution to populations’ gene pool. Fisher
considered a case of female stable population, but given appropriate data the concept
can be equally applied to the male population as well.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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Solving this problem Fisher considered the birth as a loan given to the child and
that child's reproductive value as present value of future debt payments (i.e. his children
to be born).  Lotkas’ ( Lotka 1922) intrinsic rate of natural increase was used as a
discounting rate in calculating the present value mentioned above:













here v(x) is a reproductive value of average person aged x,  r  is an intrinsic rate of
natural increase, and  ( ) ( ) x f x l ,  are survivorship and fertility functions (which are
time-constant since the stable population is examined).
R. A. Fisher pointed to very important feature of a total reproductive value.
Namely, he proved that for any population with time-constant mortality and fertility
regimes the total reproductive value changes with a rate equal to the Lotkas’ intrinsic
growth rate, no matter how arbitrary its age structure is. This result can be obtained if
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This property is very important in the context of aggregate population modeling and
directly links the concepts of reproductive value and demographic potential.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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Applying matrix analysis to demographic needs P. H. Leslie developed the notion
of reproductive value for discrete models of population dynamic (Leslie 1948). Several
works were devoted to examining the shape of Fisher’s reproductive value function, its
dependency on fertility and mortality patterns (Cole 1965; Espenshade and Campbell
1977). Leo Goodman (Goodman 1967a, 1967b) obtained reproductive values for
different mortality and fertility regimes and showed that total reproductive value of a
population is proportional to what was called stable equivalent Q by Nathan Keyfitz.
Goodman introduced a concept he called eventual reproductive value (Goodman
1968). He considered a reproductive value as an eventual size of that part of a live
population that is directly descendent from individuals in a given age-interval at a
specified point in time. He also pointed to possible use of reproductive value in
comparative studies of populations and in examining asymptotic trends when transiting
to stable state.
Nathan Keyfitz (Keyfitz 1968, 1985) developed a mathematical background of the
reproductive value concept and applied it to assessing the losses due to different
mortality causes, to migration, to fertility control, and to momentum of population
growth. He introduced a concept of stable equivalent of the population, which is “a
measure of fertility potential, closely related to R. A. Fisher’s reproductive value”
(Keyfitz 1969). We’ll return to this concept later when a concept of momentum will be
considered.
Nathan  Keyfitz and  Wilhelm  Flieger ( Keyfitz,  Flieger 1968, 1990) presented
reproductive value patterns for the world regions and countries.
A.2 Potential of population growth
French demographer Paul Vincent introduced another concept,  the potential of
population growth (Vincent 1945). This potential is an extent to which a population
would ultimately increase (or decrease) due to its age structure given that its fertility
and mortality patterns remain constant in future. In other words, the growth potential is
a ratio of stable equivalent population’s size, i.e., a size of stable population having the
same reproduction fashion and asymptote as a real population, to size of the real
population. Vincent presented a comparative analysis of growth potentials inherent to
age structures of France and Italy.
J. L. E. Bourgeois-Pichat developed the concept in a case of transition to a
stationary population (Bourgeois-Pichat 1968, 1971). He proposed following formula
for “net growth potential”:Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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Bourgeois-Pichat showed that without significant luck of accuracy the  ( ) x G  can
be taken as a standard for all populations. Using stable population’s age structure he
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x r , where b  is a birth rate and  r  is an intrinsic rate of natural
increase at the beginning of demographic transition.
There were Evgeny Andreev and Sergei Pirozhkov who first applied the concept of
growth potential to Russian (Soviet) population ( Andreev,  Pirozhkov 1975). They
proposed a method of calculating the growth potential for population transiting to












here  t r  is a population growth rate during t-th time interval,  r  - Lotka’s intrinsic rate
of natural increase.
A.3 Stable equivalent and population momentum
American demographer Nathan Keyfitz introduced another concept, which is similar to
net growth potential ( Keyfitz 1971). It has been called  a  momentum of population
growth (population momentum). Initially the momentum was identical to the
Bourgeois-Pichat’s realization of the Vincent’s potential, i.e., it concerned the transition
to stationary population only. Later it was generalized to the transition to any stable
state.
The idea was in the air long before the 1971. Tomas Frejka used the component
method to perform long-range projections of different populations and investigated toDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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what extent population could finally grow when fertility linearly declines to provide
stationary asymptote (Frejka 1968, 1973). Leo Goodman introducing his concept of
eventual reproductive value (Goodman 1968) noted on page 398 that population’s
“average eventual reproductive value” determines future size of the population with
respect to a corresponding stable population; the ratio of observed population’s average
reproductive value to that of a stable population equals to the population momentum as
it will be shown below. In 1969 Nathan  Keyfitz considered a concept of  stable
equivalent Q  ( Keyfitz 1969) and showed relation between  Q and the Fisher’s
reproductive value. Stable equivalent is a size of stable population having the same
asymptote as the real population. Ratio of stable equivalent to observed population size
equals to the momentum (or the growth potential) when future vital rates are assumed to
be constant. Keyfitz calculated and presented these “Q/K” ratios in his work on stable
equivalent. He also noted that while stable equivalents based on different fertility and
mortality assumptions are “drastically different”, changes in Q are almost invariant with
respect to vital rates used. Perhaps the 1969 work of Keyfitz was first, which concerned
the potential of two-sex population. Keyfitz used linear model described by Kendal and
Goodman, which assumes female dominant fertility (Kendal 1949; Goodman 1953).
It his 1971 work Keyfitz presented first analytical study of the concept he called
momentum (Keyfitz 1971, 1985). Using the Fisher’s reproductive value Keyfitz derived
a following formula for the population momentum:
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here  m  is a mean age at childbearing in the stationary population. After appropriate
rearrangements this formula coincides with Bourgeois-Pichat’s expression (5) for the
Vincent’s potential. For initial population that has a stable age distribution Keyfitz














here  0 R  is a net reproduction rate before the transition to stationary reproduction
regime. Population momentum was widely used to show that Third World countries
would significantly grow even under the bare replacement level of fertility. For
example, Keyfitz estimated that the 1965 population of Ecuador would increase by 67%
while transiting to a stationary state.
After the seminal work of  Keyfitz (1971) many authors concerned ways of
generalizing and estimating the population momentum. James Frauenthal considered
gradual shift in fertility to bare replacement level (Frauenthal 1975); he generalizedDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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Keyfitz results, which concerned only abrupt proportional decline of fertility. S. Mitra
generalized the Keyfitz relationship taking into account changes in both a level and age-
structure of fertility (Mitra 1976). He also considered transitions to stationary state with
fertility declining as a polynomial function of time ( Mitra 1987). In the same line
concerning different scenarios of fertility decline Cerone, Tuljapurkar, and Li obtained
their generalizations of Keyfitz’s relationships (Cerone 1996; Tuljapurkar and Li 1997).
Potter, Wolowyna, and Kulkarni examined the population momentum when fertility
gradually declines as a result of sterilization mechanism (Potter,  Wolowyna, and
Kulkarni 1977). Australian researcher Kenneth  Tognetti ( Tognetti 1976) extended
Keyfitz results in several directions. He considered a transition from one stable state to
another, latter not necessarily being a stationary one. In addition to changes in fertility
he also examined changes in mortality. Simplifying Keyfitz relationship (8) Tognetti
introduced a new concept of  gross reproductive worth, which equals to Fisher’s
reproductive value when population has a stationary asymptote. Robert  Schoen and
Young Kim exploring a convergence to stability (Schoen, Kim 1991) generalized the
momentum concept to the case of asymptotically stable but not stationary populations,
just like  Tognetti did. They also introduced a concept of age-specific momentum
( ) t x, W , which is equal to the ratio of corresponding age groups in stable equivalent
and observed populations.
Samuel Preston and Ansley Coale (Preston, Coale 1982) pointed out a relation
between the observed growth rate and the intrinsic growth rate, i.e., the growth rate of
corresponding stable population. They showed that the mean of age-specific growth
rates below some age  A must equal the intrinsic growth rate;  A lying within the
childbearing interval. This result has an interesting link to the concept of momentum;
the link, which was later discussed in other works. Preston argued that the age  A
mentioned above could be taken equal to the mean length of generation  T without
significant lack of accuracy (Preston 1986). In terms of Schoen and Kim (Schoen, Kim
1991) this means that the average age-specific momentum for ages below T equals to
one, i.e., zero to T age segment isn’t affected to population momentum. Based on his
finding Preston proposed a simple relationship for the momentum when initial
population is stable with a net reproductive rate  0 R :
2
0 2 0 0 R C R C C T T T T T + + = W ,  (9)
here  x TC  is a proportion of persons in age interval x to x+T in the initial population.
Kenneth Wachter criticized the Preston’s findings (Wachter 1988). He showed that
for some populations momentum couldn’t be entirely confined to the age span above T.
He examined conditions, which could guarantee relations proposed by Preston and
considered growth-free segments in general, taking into account both the  Keyfitz’sDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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scenario of immediate fertility fall to replacement level and slower transitions toward
the stationary state.
Young Kim, Robert Schoen, and Sankara Sarma made the next step in exploring
the momentum and growth-free age segment (Kim, Schoen, and Sarma 1991). They
developed several exact relationships and proposed following simple estimation for the
momentum:
( )
( ) G : 0 C




here G is a mean age at childbearing,  ( ) G C : 0 0  is a proportion of the observed
population under the age G, and  ( ) G CL : 0  is that of the corresponding stationary
population, i.e., of the life table population. Actually Kim, Schoen, and Sarma used the
age 30 as an approximate for G with rather high accuracy of momentum estimates.
Later Kim and Schoen (Kim and Schoen 1997) supported and advanced their results
using regression analysis to explore the relationship between the momentum and
different aging measures.
A.4 Demographic potential
Author developed a concept of demographic potential (Ediev 1999) when working with
a task of estimating population’s demographic losses caused by external factors. To be
concrete, several populations of Northern Caucasus were considered, which were
affected to Stalin’s deportations in mid-40s. Demographic losses caused by the
deportation couldn’t be estimated directly due to lack of a data; neither the component
method could be used for the same reason. The aim was to solve the problem without
getting into population projections at all. As a result the concept of demographic
potential was developed, which is an index changing as a simple and easily predictable
function of time when population reproduces itself without external influence.
‘Unexpected’ changes of demographic potential would reveal an effect of external
forces, which deviate the population from its ‘normal’ trend. In this context ‘external’
influence is anything that results in deviation of the population reproduction process
from a reproduction regime that is assumed to be normal, i.e., distinguishing between
‘external’ and ‘intrinsic’ factors is a matter of model assumptions. Migration, increase
in mortality, etc. can usually be excluded from the reproduction model and therefore
attributed to external factors. Having in mind linearity of usual demographic models,
the demographic potential assumed to be additive function. More generally theDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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demographic potential can be assumed to be homogeneous function of first degree of
variables related to population composition (e.g., age-sex groups).
The simplest dynamic, which could be desired for demographic potential is time-
constancy. In this case age-specific demographic potentials equate the following
relationship (Ediev 1999) if one-sex population is concerned:
( ) ( )




dy y t c t y f
t x l
t y l




here the first variable corresponds to age of a person and second variable corresponds to
his moment of birth. Equation (11) is dual to Lotka’s renewal equation (Lotka 1939).
This duality is even clearer in expression written for newborns:




; 0 ; ; ; 0 dy y t c t y f t y l t c , (12)
When fertility and mortality functions used in (11) are time-constant, demographic
potentials became proportional to Fisher’s reproductive values due to ergodic property
(Ediev 1999) similar to that of population models (see references and brilliant proof in
(Arthur 1982)). Namely, demographic potentials decrease as exponential function of
time, i.e.  ( ) ( )
t e x c t x c
r - = 0 ; ; , and are equal to Fisher’s reproductive value if
demographic potential of a newborn is set to be one and other potentials are expressed
in terms of the newborn’s potential:
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For a population with constant fertility and mortality the change rate of the total
demographic potential expressed in newborns equals to the intrinsic growth rate. This
follows both from the property of the total reproductive value mentioned above and
from the fact that when fertility and mortality are time-constant demographic potentials
decrease as an exponential function with the rate equal to the intrinsic growth rate.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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Figure 18: Intrinsic growth rate for US female population estimated by US National
Center for Health Statistics and different approximations of this rate.
This property being extended to a population with arbitrary reproduction regime is used
in the paper. Namely, in all the estimations fixed age-sex pattern of demographic
potential is used, that is based on US 1991 data. While using the same standard for
calculating demographic potentials, it is supposed that the change rate of total
demographic potential equals to the population’s asymptotic growth rate called
“intrinsic growth rate”. Rationales behind this extension should be mentioned here. As a
matter of fact the concept of reproductive value can’t be extended to the case of
population with varying reproduction regime. Nor the concepts of growth potential and
momentum can be applied to this case. The way of justifying the use of fixed age
pattern of reproductive value for population with changing fertility and mortality is to
interpret that pattern and other estimations based on it as approximations for unknown
actual values. This way of thinking has its own merits, as it is illustrated on Fig. 18. It is
the US 1991-based demographic potential pattern that is used to produce approximation
for intrinsic growth rate shown on the figure. It is seen that this approximation is well
enough. It’s closer to the intrinsic rate obtained using actual fertility and mortality
patterns (NCHS estimates) than the change rate of 0-30 age segment; latter estimate is
justified by results of Preston, Kim, Schoen, and Sarma discussed above. Change rate of
the population size isn’t acceptable as approximation for the intrinsic growth rate and is
presented on the Fig. 18 for comparative purposes only.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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There is a way of interpreting the demographic potential different from the way
just presented. Actually the demographic potential’s change rate can be taken as a rate,
which is interesting by itself and can be taken as a part of the population model; e.g., as
a part of population projection scenario, as it is made in this paper. This rate can be
called “intrinsic growth rate” since it determines asymptotic change rate of the
population just like the Lotka’s intrinsic rate does in the stable population theory. Even
more, both rates are equal when an asymptotically stable population is concerned. Let’s
look how assumptions about the demographic potential’s change rate can be used to
construct a model alternative to component method. We’ll consider first the simplest
case of discrete one-sex population consisting of persons differing only by their age,
i.e., other demographic variables such as parity, migration status, etc. are ignored in the
model; in addition mortality schedule is set to be constant. Idea is that the number of
births can be estimated from the balance of demographic potential:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ￿
=
+ + + = = +
X
x
x x t n c t n c t C t C
1
0 0 1 1 1 l   (14)
here lower indexes relate to age, l  is a potential growth rate set to be constant, and X
is an upper age. Using survival probabilities  ( ) ( ) t n t n p x x x 1 1 + = +  we obtain from
(14):
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In continuous model we have a corresponding expression for births density B(t):
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
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0 0 0
r (16)
here  r  is an intrinsic rate of natural increase, which is similar to that used in stable
population theory (from the viewpoint of the role in population asymptote).
Hence the model based on constant change rate of demographic potential is linear
and can be formalized in matrix form:
( ) ( ) t AN t N = +1 (17)





















































































Projection matrix A has the same structure as the Leslie matrix, which arises in the well-
known component method. All the differences between two matrices are in the first
row. In the Leslie matrix elements of the first row are obtained from the age-specific
birth rates corrected for infant mortality, while in the model (17) these elements are
determined by the demographic potential pattern, surviving probabilities, and the
intrinsic growth rate. It can be shown that if demographic potentials are taken equal to
reproductive values corresponding to the reproduction regime of the component
method, than the matrix A is identical to the Leslie matrix. I.e., the class of models of
the (17) type includes the component method but is wider than the class of component
method alone. Starting from different age patterns of demographic potential wide
variety of population models can be constructed. For example, based on works on
momentum-free age segment,  0-30 age group can be taken as the demographic
potential, which changes with intrinsic growth rate.
Taking into account wide prevalence of the component method, it is interesting to
compare forecasts obtained by use of the model (17) and those obtained by the
component method, given the same intrinsic growth rate used in both methods. Figs. 19
to 21 present some results of these forecasts obtained for the female population of
Russia. The component method projections presented on the figures are based on fixed
mortality pattern (based on Russian data from 1996) and fertility patterns of fixed age
structure (based on Russian rates from 1998). Different scenarios with different intrinsic
growth rates are obtained varying the level of fertility. In addition to the component
method two projections are made using the US 1991 reproductive value and 0-30 age
segment as demographic potentials in (17); mortality pattern in both cases is the same
as in the component method.
It is clearly seen that, firstly, both demographic potential-based projections are
close to that obtained by the component method and, secondly, the demographic
potential based on the US 1991 reproductive values provides better results. Actually
demographic potential-based forecasts’ accuracy (compared to the component method)
can be remarkably improved since the asymptote of forecasts can be easily obtained
using ideas described below in paragraphs concerned the relations of the demographicDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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potential concept to the momentum. This improvement isn’t made here since accuracy
of less than 10% is sufficient for the purposes of the paper.
Figure 19:  Russian female population projected from 2000 using the component
method and two different realizations of the demographic potential
concept. IGR=1%.
Figure 20: Russian female population projected from 2000 using the component
method and two different realizations of the demographic potential
concept. IGR=0%.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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Figure 21: Russian female population projected from 2000 using the component
method and two different realizations of the demographic potential
concept. IGR =-1%.
There are other important issues related to the demographic potential and corresponding
population models: ergodic property of those models, ergodic property of demographic
potentials themselves, construction of more advanced population models (two-sex
population, parity-progression models, demographic-economic models, demographic-
ecological models, probabilistic models, etc.). These issues fall far beyond the scope of
this paper and those interested in these questions are welcomed to contact the author.
In addition to providing results close to those obtained by the component method,
population models based on the demographic potential concept have additional and
very important advantage – they can be reformulated on the aggregate level, as it is
discussed in Appendix B.
Now let’s look how the demographic potential concept relates to the Vincent’s
growth potential or the  Keyfitz’s momentum and how those concepts can be
generalized. Let the total demographic potential changes as some standard function of
time, which isn’t affected by the population structure:
( ) ( ) ( ) t g C t C population population 0 = , (19)Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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here  ( ) t g  is some standard function, which isn’t affected by the structure or any other
initial condition of the population. Ratio of sizes of two populations having different
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here  ( ) ( )





population =  is an average demographic potential at the moment t.
Structures of both populations will converge in future given the both populations
will have the same reproduction regimes. This convergence follows from the ergodic
property (Arthur 1982). If the total demographic potential is a homogeneous function of
first degree from population structure-specific variables, than the average potential
depends on population structure and doesn’t depend on the population size. It means the
convergence of average demographic potentials in future. Therefore the asymptotic
ratio of populations having the same reproduction regime in future equals to the ratio of
demographic potentials at the initial (or any other) moment of time.
Growth potential or the momentum of age structure of asymptotically stable
population is a ratio of size of the corresponding stable population to the size of the
population itself given the same asymptote of both populations. In other words it is a
ratio of the stable equivalent to the size of observed population. This concept can be
generalized using the notion of demographic potential. From the relationship (20) and
from conclusion about the asymptote of average demographic potential made above it
follows that for asymptotically stable population the momentum equals to the ratio of
observed population’s average demographic potential to that of the stable equivalent
population, 
* c :
( ) ( )
* c
t c
t = W (21)
After appropriate transformations this equation turns into equations (5) and (7)
proposed by Bourgeois-Pichat and Keyfitz when asymptotically stationary population is
concerned. When 0-30 age segment is used as a demographic potential than (21) turns
into expression (10) proposed by Kim, Schoen, and Sarma. Actually the concept of
momentum can be extended to the case of “transition” to arbitrary reproduction regime,
not necessarily stable. Let two populations have the same reproduction regime in future
but differ in their structures. Then the growth potential or the momentum of theDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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structure of one population with respect to another is given by the ratio of their average
demographic potentials:
( ) ( )





2 , 1 = W (22)
As it is discussed in the Appendix B, average demographic potentials for stable
population can be estimated based  on such an aggregate measures as the intrinsic
growth rate and the life expectancy at birth. From this result different estimates for the
momentum can be developed. For example, when the transition from one stable state to
another is concerned, following estimate of the momentum of two-sex population can
be obtained:
619 . 0 00325 . 0 86 . 8
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here  0 ,e r  are the intrinsic growth rate and life expectancy at birth of the stable
population before the transition; asterisk denotes these values for the stable population
after the transition.
Similar results can be obtained for other types of transition from one reproduction
regime to another.
In expressions (20) to (22) population size can be substituted by any other
population index, which is a homogeneous function of first degree from population
structure-specific variables; this way the momentum concept can be generalized to the
concept of the momentum of growth for arbitrary population index.
Appendix B. Aggregate population modeling and forecasting
Demographic potential concept described in the Appendix A can be used to obtain
aggregate population models of good performance ( Ediev 2000). These models are
based on the model (17) and its extensions, which provide results close to those of the
component method. Given the intrinsic growth rate one can forecast aggregate
demographic potential within the model (17) without age-sex analysis:
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here  ( ) t r  – demographic potential’s change rate at time  t , which is called here
“intrinsic rate of natural increase” due to the role in population asymptote, the role
analogous to that of the Lotka’s intrinsic rate in the stable population theory. When the
intrinsic growth rate is constant, the demographic potential became an exponential
function of time variable t.
The size of a population couldn’t be adequately modeled in the same way as the
demographic potential. Age structure changes in the population and inertia of
demographic processes make such a model too simplistic. Nonetheless (24) can be used
to obtain the population size  ( ) t N  indirectly, using the average demographic potential:
( ) ( )
( ) t c
t C
t N = (25)
Structure of any population tends to converge to its ultimate stable structure (Arthur
1982;  Schoen, Kim 1991). We can therefore expect that the average demographic
potential determined by the population structure alone will also converge to its
asymptotic value. Let’s denote the average potential’s asymptote determined by the
observed reproduction regime as  ( ) t c
* . Following model of the average potential’s
convergence to its asymptote  ( ) t c
*  proved its good performance (Ediev 2000, 2001):
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a b , (26)
here  b a,  are model parameters. Discrete variant of (26) is following:
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] 1 t c t c b t c t c a ) t ( c 1 t c
* - - ￿ + - ￿ = - + , (27)
here  683 . 0 , 0126 . 0 » - » b a  are parameters, which can be estimated using
regression procedures. Performance of the model (27) can be observed in Fig. 20, which
presents actual and modeled dynamic of the US female population’s average
demographic potential as a function of difference between the average demographic
potential and its asymptote  ( ) t c
* .Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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Figure 20:  Changes and distance to the stable equivalent for the mean demographic
potential of the US female population: actual and modeled by (27).
There is one more ingredient to be added to expressions (24) to (27) in order to
complete the aggregate population model. Namely, the asymptote  ( ) t c
*  for average
potential is to be modeled on the aggregate level as well. Asymptotic average potential
( ) t c
*  depends on the population structure, which is determined in turn by the intrinsic
growth rate  ( ) t r  and mortality. Simplest aggregate model reflecting both the intrinsic
growth rate and the mortality is following:
( ) ( ) ( ) 0 0
* k t e k t r k t c e r + ￿ + ￿ = , (28)
here  ( ) t e0  is a life expectancy at birth at time  t, and
619 . 0 , 00325 . 0 , 86 . 8 0 » - » » k k k e r  are parameters, which can be estimated by
regression procedure. This estimation doesn’t work in all the range of possible values of
the intrinsic growth rate and the life expectancy. But it works well enough for “natural”
values of the intrinsic growth rate from about –3% to +3%, and of the life expectancy
from 30 to 80 years. Accuracy of this estimate (errors of less than 10%) determines the
aggregate model’s long-range accuracy.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 9
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Relation (28) completes the aggregate model of the population size:
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
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( ) ( ) ( )
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This model was tested by author on data from different populations and proved its high
accuracy. It leads to errors of less than 2% on average and less than 10% in maximum.
Important property of this model is that forecasting errors don’t cumulate, and the
method can be used in long-range forecasts. For open populations some arrangements
are to be made concerning migration. Simplest assumption based on migration statistics
is used in the paper: that the average demographic potential of migrants is 20% higher
than that of the main population.